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-Scholastic Aptitude Test Scores: 
An Explanation of Interstate Mean Score Differentials 
Each year academia eagerly awaits its own report card on 
performance: the College Board's announcement of mean Scholastic 
Aptitude Test (SAT) scores. The SAT is a standardized academic 
aptitude test typically administered to high school seniors. 
National mean scores on this test have come to be a measure of 
educational quality in the minds of many educators. 
For eighteen consecutive years scores on one or both 
sections of the test (mathematics or verbal) fell. The spell 
was broken in 1981-82 when the average verbal score rose two 
points and the average mathematics score rose three points over 
the preceding year. College Board President George Hanford 
hailed the rise as a sign that, "serious efforts by the nation's 
schools and their students to improve the quality of education 
are tak ing effect." 11 I 
Within the spirit of national educational reform, states 
individually have strived to improve the quality of their 
educational programs. In response to a desire on the part of 
states to compare themselves educationally to other states, 
Secretary of Education Terrence H. Bell released, "State 
Education Statistics: State Performance Outcomes, Resource 
111 "SAT Verbal, Math Scores Up for First Time in 19 Years," 
Chronicle of Higher Education, 25, September 10, 1982, 1. 
1 
-Inputs, and Population Characteristics, 1972 and 1982."121 This 
report ranked each state in thirteen areas that might affect 
education or be an indicator of educational success, including 
mean SAT or American College Test (ACT) scores. The report was 
designed so as to allow interstate comparisons of measures of 
quality, tempered by a recognition of the relative assets and 
limitations of each state. I n part i cu lar, the report suggested 
that correct interpretation'of the mean test scores and their 
rankings included examination of the percent of seniors taking 
the test, the percent of students living in poverty, the percent 
of minority students, the percent of handicapped students, as 
well as many of the other variables included in the data set. 
The release generated many theories about correct 
interpretation of the rankings. Educational representatives 
echoed the concerns of the Department of Education over the 
validity of utilizing mean test scores to evaluate educational 
quality because of great differences in such variables as the 
percent of seniors taking the exam, the percent of the student 
population living in poverty or the percent of students who are 
of a minority race. 
The purpose of this research is to shed some quantified 
light on this matter of interstate comparisons of mean SAT 
·scores. First, let us more closely examine some existing 
hypotheses about the causes of these differentials. 
121 U.S. Department of Education, "State Education 
Statistics: State Performance Outcomes, Resources Inputs, and 
Population Characteristics, 1972, and 1982," released January 5, 
1984. 
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-The College Board, which administers the SAT, generally 
discourages interstate comparisons simply because of the 
different proportions of state populations that take the test./31 
In twenty-one states plus the District of Columbia the SAT is 
more commonly taken. Twenty-eight states have a greater 
proportion of the population taking the ACT. The state of 
Washington administers a test different from either of these most 
frequently. 
Data suggests that the smaller the percentage of seniors 
taking the SAT, the higher the mean score. The explanation for 
this phenomenon is that in a state such as Iowa, where only three 
percent of the seniors take the SAT and fifty-four percent take 
the ACT, a senior who takes the SAT does so because of a 
distinguishing need. The most plausible reason an Iowan might 
take the SAT would be to apply for admission to a particular 
school, probably out-of-state (most educational institutions in 
Iowa would accept an ACT score). When one considers that fully 
thirty-two of the thirty-four institutions grouped in Barron's 
Profiles of American Colleges as "Most Competitive" (in terms of 
admissions) require the SAT test 141, it becomes apparent that it 
may be that only the brightest, most academically talented Iowans 
have a need to take the SAT. Another reason especially bright 
students might take the SAT in Iowa would be to compete for 
131 "How the States Fared on SAT Scores," Education USA, 
October 4, 1982, p. 45. ---
141 College Division of Barron's Educational Series, 
Barron's Profiles of American Colleges (Woodbury, New York and 
elsewhere, 19801. 
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National Merit Scholarships. This reasoning is of course 
applicable to the majority of primarily ACT states. 
Another cause of score differentials was suggested by Thomas 
Shannon, head of the National School Boards Association. He 
noted that the highest scoring states, "have a very homogeneous 
population--no immigrants, very strong family settings." He 
continued, "What possible relationship is there between New 
Hampshire and the state of New York?"/51 
It is also commonly suggested that expenditures on education 
are positively related to quality, including expenditures on 
teachers' salaries. /6/ 
Now that we have examined some current thought on the causes 
of interstate mean SAT score differentials, let us test some of 
these rough hypotheses to see if they withstand empirical 
scrutiny. 
Any model attempting to explain SAT score differentials 
would at least begin with what is currently the most popular 
explanation of these state variations: the proportion of 
students taking the exam. The rationale for the inclusion of 
this as an explanatory variable was presented above. 
If one believes that to a certain extent the SAT captures 
learning processes and acquired know ledge, one might guess that 
·mean state scores would be affected by any consistent bias a 
lSI Peter Johnson and Sally Ann Stewart, "The Top-Rated 
Sytems Credit Involved Parents," USA Today, January 6, 1984, p. 
7A. 
161 Johnson and Stewart; Gerald M. Boyd, "Dropout Rate in 
Schools Rose Sharply Since '72," New York Times, January 6, 1984, 
p. 10. 
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state might have toward enhancing a student's learning. One 
measure that can be used to explain how these differences could 
come about would be the ratio of teachers to students. One would 
expect that teachers with an excess teaching burden might not be 
as effecti ve as teachers wi th fewer students, and that students 
who studied under such overburdened teachers would be affected so 
as to lower scores achieved on a standardized test such as the 
SAT. 
Another variable likely to affect a state's mean score 
might be the level of education of the state's population. One 
might hypothesize that students surrounded by a better educated 
populous might develop skills useful in attaining higher 
achievement on the SAT. Likewise, income per capita might be a 
measure of productive skills present in a state population that 
could influence students so as to raise their mean SAT scores. 
While this variable is probably somewhat colinear to the level of 
education (they have a correlation coefficient of .60), income 
per capita might capture existing skills within the populace that 
were not developed through formal education. 
The percentage of minority students enrolled in school might 
affect mean SAT scores. Minority students generally perform at 
lower levels on the SAT test than do whites./71 Although there 
has been much debate about possible race bias within standardized 
tests of intelligence and aptitude, the truth or falsity of such 
claims has no relevance in this discussion, since the cause of 
171 "White Students Score Highest on SAT Exams: New Report 
Shows Link to Family-income level," Ch~~ni~l~ 01 Hi~her 
Education, October 13, 1982, p. 1. 
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-poor minority performance does not alter its affect on mean state 
scores. 
The level of urbanization within a state might also affect a 
state's mean performance, although we have no defined a priori 
expectations as to whether urbanization increases or decreases 
scores. This is essentially an empirical question. 
In order to test our hypotheses that mean SAT scores are 
dependent upon the percent taking the test, the teacher-to-pup i I 
ratio, state education levels, income per capita, the percent of 
minority students, and the degree of urbanization, an ordinary 
least squares regression was applied to the data, with mean SAT 
scores as the dependent variable. The regression was performed 
according to a linear model, assuming an intercept term with a 
constant coefficient for each variable. The results of this 
regression are printed in Table One and are reported as 
regression number seven. 
The estimated coefficients for each of the dependent 
variables appears on row seven under the appropriate variable 
name (a key to the variable names and the source and nature of 
the data used can be found on page 16). The reliablity of the 
coefficients' estimates is reported in the form of at-statistic, 
which appears in parentheses directly below the coefficient. 
Regression seven supports our hypotheses in part with highly 
significant results. The percent of seniors taking the test 
(%SAT) does appear to negatively affect mean scores, as we 
suspected. Our regression estimates that for each percentage 
point increase we may expect a decrease of about two and a half 
points in the mean score. This relationship is extremely 
6 
reliable, with an alpha error estimate of less than .001. Also 
highly significant (a = .05) and of the expected sign are the 
estimated coefficients for the teacher-to-student ratio 181, the 
level of education within the state /9/, and the percentage of 
minority students. 
The variable that represents the degree of urbanization 
(METRO) is not quite significant at the a = .05 level. It has a 
positive sign, though, which would at least preliminarily provide 
support for a hypotheses that urbanization has a positive effect 
on mean SAT scores. 
The income per capita variable (Y/CAP) approaches a = .05 
significance, but its sign is negative, which is contrary to our 
hypotheses. This is possibly due to a specification error in the 
model and certainly warrants further experimentation. 
Although we have examined the coefficients of this model 
individually, we have not yet evaluated the regression as a 
whole. Table One reports the F-ratio for the entire regression, 
which indicates that our model is extremely significant overall. 
181 The reader should note the the data used in what is 
commonly referred to as a teacher-to-student ratio is actually in 
this case a pup i I per teacher rat i 0, Y ie I ding numbers such as 16 
or 24. The expected sign on this coefficient is thus negative. 
One interprets the estimated coefficient of 3.95 as follows: for 
-each state mean increase of one pupil per teacher it is estimated 
that the mean SAT score for that state will drop nearly four 
points. 
191 While it might seem incredulous at first glance that 
increasing the mean number of years of education within a state 
would increase its mean SAT score 107 points, the estimate 
becomes more realistic in light of the fact that the standard 
deviation of state means is only slightly over 2 months (the mean 
is twelve and one-half years). 
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The R 2 adjusted for degrees of freedom is .875. Because of our 
adequate sample size (50) and small number of calculated 
coefficients, the adjusted R 2 is very close in magnitude to the 
unadjusted R 2. The R 2 indicates the percent of the variance in 
mean SAT scores explained by our model. 
This is, all in all, a credible explanation of SAT mean 
score variations. However, there are still other factors that 
might contribute to differences in states' mean scores. One 
source of information about the make-up of a state's test takers 
might be its graduation rate. An educational system that fosters 
learning and creates a respect for education probably would have 
a high graduation rate and, provided such attitudes are reflected 
by SAT scores, relatively high mean SAT scores. Another possibly 
relevant consideration is the percent of educational revenues a 
state receives from the Federal government. Theory gives us 
contradictory predictions about the sign of this variable, 
however. One the one hand, one might reason that only the most 
disadvantaged educational systems would qualify for Federal aid. 
On the other hand, it could be that Federal funds are often 
earmarked for special projects that have unusually high 
productivity in terms of enhanced student skill. This is once 
again an empirical question that can be addressed in this data 
·set. 
Regression one in Table One utilizes these two additional 
variables plus the variables significant at the five percent 
level from regression seven as independent variables. The 
results of this regression are slightly stronger than those of 
regression one, as evidenced by the F-ratio and the adjusted R 2. 
8 
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As anticipated, the graduation rate (GRAD) carries a positive 
coefficient. The variable describing Federal funds as a percent 
of educational revenues (FED) has a positive sign. Regression 
eight contains the same explanatory variables as regression one, 
with METRO added, which is not significant. Regression eleven 
adds both METRO and Y/CAP. This regression is especially 
interesting because in this combination of explanatory variables 
METRO is significant at the five percent level, unlike any of the 
previously examined regressions. 
An area of particular interest to legislators, taxpayers, 
and teachers is the subject of monies spent on education. Two 
variables in this data set attempt to capture this pecuniary 
flavor. Mean teachers' salaries are expected to vary directly 
with mean SAT scores because of the market theory. Higher 
salaries encourage persons with greater opportunity costs 
(typically more talented individuals) to enter the teaching field 
and relocation of teachers from other less-generous states. 
Assuming these persons are better teachers and that better 
teachers can positively influence standardized test scores such 
as the SAT, scores are expected to be higher. In a similar 
manner it is sometimes thought that by increasing expenditures 
per pupil the quality of education may increase, which might be 
expected to be reflected in mean SAT scores. 
Regressions two, three, nine, and ten use these variables. 
Although the coefficients of these variables are not significant, 
the overall regressions are still reliable. All of these 
estimated coefficients have negative signs, contrary to expected 
9 
results. In interpreting these coefficients it should be 
remembered, however, that the SAT is not designed to be a measure 
the quality of a student's education, but rather his or her 
aptitude. It is a matter of quite some debate just what it is 
that the SAT does measure, however, this paper intends only to 
aid in the interpretation of comparisons between state means. 
Other descriptions of the student population to be examined 
within this paper include the percent who are living in poverty 
and who are handicapped. A priori one expects both of these 
conditions to adversely affect a student's performance in school 
and perhaps on SAT tests. Examination of regressions five, six, 
twelve, and thirteen, however, shows that these estimated 
coefficients are positive, although not significant at the five 
percent level. One possible explanaton for this phenomenon is 
that the effects of these handicaps are offset by the FED 
variable, since much of the Federal aid given to schools is 
particularly distributed and designed to aid the handicapped and 
those living in poverty. The results of these regressions 
indicate that Federal funds have not only offset disadvantages, 
but may have even created advantages. 
The results of the regressions in Table One have generally 
supported hypotheses that the percent taking the SAT, the percent 
of students graduating, the teacher-student ratio, the percent of 
revenues received from the Federal government, state educational 
levels, and the percent of students who are minorities influence 
state mean scores on the SAT. Some surprises are that teachers' 
salaries and expenditures-per-pupil do not seem to have 
influence, as well as income per capita and the percent in 
10 
-poverty or handicapped. 
Does the region of the country a state is in somehow affect 
its mean SAT score? Table Two contains information that will 
help us clarify our thought on the matter. D u mm y va ria b I e 
regressions were run using the South as the ommitted region./101 
Regression fourteen illustrates such as regression. Notice that 
the Y/CAP variable along with the regional variables northeast 
and north central are not significant at the five percent level. 
This tells us that the Northeast and North Central regions are 
not statistically different in terms of predicted mean SAT scores 
than the South. 
The remaining regressions in Table Two use a base comprised 
of the South plus the Northeast and the North Central states. 
The Southwest and the West are each statistically different from 
th is base. 
These regressions in general tend to explain a greater 
proportion of the variance in mean state SAT scores than those 
without the regional variables. The reason underlying this 
1101 Dummy variables are assigned a value of one if the 
state is in the region, zero otherwise. The region of the South 
is ommitted to preclude extreme multicollinearity. 
Interpretation of the model is as follows: a Southern state (the 
South being the ommitted (base) region) has an estimated mean SAT 
score equal to the sum of the coefficients times the state's 
particular corresponding variable values. For a Southern state, 
therefore, the coefficients for the other regions do not change 
its score, since it has zero for its value in those regions. 
States in other regions would estimate their mean score likewise, 
except that for in the appropriate regional variable the value of 
one means that the coefficient for that regional variable is 
added to the score. This model assumes that these regional 
differences are correctly identified in terms of shifting 
intercepts, or in other words, that the coefficients of the other 
variables are constant regionally. 
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numerical find is as yet unclear. What is it about the southwest 
and the West that makes states in those regions have lower mean 
scores? This question undoubtedly deserves further research 
using variables as yet untested or perhaps using different types 
of mode Is. 
How do the results reported here aid us in using mean SAT 
scores to evaluate the performance of a particular state's 
educational system? If there is an element of educational 
quality distinct from that attached to our explanatory variables, 
this element would manifest itself in the error term. Let us use 
regression one from Table One as an illustration. Like all of 
the other regressions here, regression one explains a great deal 
of the variance in mean SAT scores and is highly significant. 
This tells us that we have done a good job of specifying mean SAT 
scores. Because of this, our error terms can be statistically 
considered to be normally distributed, or in other words, the 
differences between actual observed 1982 mean SAT scores and the 
scores estimated from this regression can be assumed to be caused 
by random error. Continuing this reasoning, we know that this 
separate element of educational quality (separate from the 
already included explanatory variables) cannot be measured within 
mean SAT scores in a statistically significant form. The only 
~egitimate method of use mean SAT scores to discern quality 
differentials is to use coefficients for variables that may proxy 
quality. In regression one these could be the graduation rate, 
the teacher-per-pupil ratio, the Federal revenues variable, and 
12 
-the mean amount of education in the state population./111 Using 
some sort of weighted combination of these variables and the data 
for a state would be the only way to discern quality of state 
education from this research. 
Having acknowledged '~at analysis of the residual in search 
of a qua lit Y fa c tor i ~: s tat i s tic all y un sou n d for the s e 
regressions, it nevertheless is interesting to see how such an 
analysis might be done. The estimated mean SAT scores from 
regression one for each state appear in Table Three. Assuming 
that our model correctly specifies the equation, the residual for 
each state is composed of entirely random noise. If, however, we 
believe that there is some ommitted variable, we expect that its 
effect will appear in the residual. If educational quality is 
hypothesized to exist within the residual, a negative residual 
would indicate that the state in question has less educational 
quality than a state with a positive residual. 
In the case of regression one, New York and Iowa tie for the 
largest positive residual: fifty-three points. Alaska has the 
greatest negative residual: fifty points. Indiana has a 
negative residual of twenty-two points and I llinois has a 
positive residual of eleven points. Once again it should be 
remembered that analysis of this sort is innapropriate for this 
~ata. As further evidence of this it will be noted that the 
largest percentage error of estimate for any state (New York) is 
only six percent. 
1111 These variables may have different amounts of impact on 
educational quality. 
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The quantitative work done in this paper supports many of 
the hypotheses already expressed by educational commentators 
about state mean SAT differp.ntials, the most cited and most 
statistically significant of which is the percentage of seniors 
taking the test. It has been shown that much of the variance in 
state mean SAT scores is caused by factors beyond the control of 
educators, such as the percent of students who are minorities. 
This research suggests that the SAT does not provide a good 
medium for making educational quality comparisons between states, 
perhaps because this is not the purpose of the test. 
Further research in this area could include investigation 
into the cause of some of the unexpected signs on coefficients 
such as income per capita. The underlying cause of the significant 
regional variables is also worthy of investigation. Econometric 
theory leads one to suspect multicollinearity and 
heteroscedasticity within the data. Additional research should 
explore these matters. 
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-KEY TO VARIABLES* 
SAT mean = 944.72 std. dey. = 72.91 
Mean SAT score. 
Department of Education and "How the States Fared on SAT 
Scores," Education Today, October 4, 1982, p. 45. 
%SAT mean = 27.22 std. dey. = 22.65. 
The percent of high school seniors taking the SAT. 
Department of Education and Education Today. 
GRAD mean = 73.29 std. dey. = 12.61 
Percent of the ninth grade class from 1978 the completed 
high schoo l. 
PIT mean = 18.48 std. dey. = 2.42 
Average number of pupils per teacher. 
FED mean = 9.41 std. dey. = 4.48 
Percent of school revenue that comes from the Federal 
government. 
EDUC mean = 12.48 
Mean number 
population. 
std. dey. = 0.19 
of years of education 
%MIN mean = 25.77 std. dey. = 19.06 
for the state 
Percent of enrolled students who are a minority race. 
METRO mean = 61.76 std. dey. = 23.34 
Percent of state population 
Metropolitan Statistical Area. 
the Census 
TSAL mean = 16,578 std. dey. = 3,603 
Average teacher salary. 
XIPUP mean = 2,456 std. dey. = 646 
living in a State 
Source: U.S. Bureau of 
Current expenditures per pupil. Does not include capital 
outlay. 
YICAP mean = 10,768 std. dey. = 1,674 
Income per cap ita. 
%POV mean = 15.02 std. dey. = 4.95 
Percent of enrolled students living in poverty. 
%HAND mean = 8.86 std. dey. = 1.68 
Percent of enrolled handicapped students. 
NE 6 states 
Northeast geographic area, by convention. 
15 
-NC 13 states 
North Central geographic area, by convention. 
SW 5 states 
Southwest geographic area, by convention. 
WEST 9 states 
Western geographic area, by convention. 
* Unless otherwise noted all data is from the U.S. 
Department of Education, "State Education Statistics: State 
Performance Outcomes, Resource Inputs, and Population 
Characteritics, 1972, and 1982," released January 5, 1984. 
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TABLE ONE 
, INTER %SAT ORAD PIT FED EDUe %MIN METRO TSAL X/PUP I/CAP %POV %HAND F-RATIO AJ'D R2 
1 177.73 -2.50 0.81 -5.98 2.29 70.70 -0.68 69.00 .893 Lll.1..o ) (2.~6l ( .1....2ll (2.S3l ( 3.SQi ( 3·331 
2 48.32 -2.54 0.77 -5.93 2.08 82.94 -0.60 -0.001 59.36 .893 (13.67 ) (2.34, ( 3.871 (2.25) ( 3.53) ( 2.68) (1. 02) 
3 109.15 -2.48 0.82 -6.36 2.25 77 .49 -0.6<; -0.004 58.30 .891 (13.06 ) (2.47) ( 3.80) (2.46) ( 2.39) ( 3.06) (0.59) 
4 129.03 -2.49 0.81 -6.22 2.22 75.83 -0.65 -0.001 57.91 .890 (13.32 ) (2.42) ( 3.58) (2.38) ( 2.85) ( 2.81) (0.30) 
5 3.88 -2.46 0.88 -5.77 2.05 83.04 -0.83 1.06 58.63 .892 (12.89 ) (2.56) ( 3.69) (2.13) ( 3.18) ( 2.95) (0.75) 
6 148.75 -2.52 0.80 -5.95 2.23 72.63 -0.66 0.61 57.87 .890 (13.05) (2.40) (3. 8)~) (2.35) (3.32) (2.96) (0.24 ) 
7 -77.21 -2.91 -9.07 106.92 -0.68 0.44 -0.007 58.02 .875 (14.27) (3.95 ) (3.76) (2.91) (1.66) (1. 62) 
8 194.65 -2.62 0.76 -6.85 2.56 69.90 -0.79 0.26 60.25 .894 (12.90) (2.31) (4.11) (2.77) (3.48) (3.58) (1.14 ) 
9 68.83 -2.65 0.72 -6.78 2.35 81. 78 -0.70 0.26 -0.001 52.84 .894 (12.91) (2.16) (4.07) (2.48) (3.50) (2.97) (1.25) (1.00) 
10 94.78 -2.60 0.76 -7.54 2.53 79.90 -0.76 0.30 -0.006 52.50 .894 (12.64) (2.31) (4.08) (2.73) (3.44) (3.40) (1.42) (0.867 ) 
11 -23.60 -2.65 0.71 -8.50 2.43 93.51 -0.71 0.43 -0.005 53.50 .896 (13.03) (2.14) (3.96) (2.62) (3.36) (3.10) (1. 74) (1. 21) 
12 -151.09 -2.60 0.87 -6.85 2.20 94.64 -1.13 0.40 2.15 54.30 .900 (12.91) (2.61) (4.17) (2.33) (3.60) (3.50) (1. 77) (1.43) 
13 211.43 -2.61 0.76 -6.89 2.60 68.80 -0.81 0.27 -0.34 51.49 .892 (12.61) (2.28) (4.02) (2.63) (3.13) (3.22 ) (1.24) 0.13 
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TABLE TWO 
, INTER %SAT GRAD PIT FED' EDUC %MIN METRO TSAL' X/PUP 'f./CAP %POV., %HAND NE NC SW WEST " F-ratio ADJ R2 
1" -636.6 -3.23 -6.33 148.37 -0.66 0.26 -0.005 6.34 -16.29 -29.99 -41. 69 39.78 .888 
(11.31) (2.26) (4.46)(2.26)(2.44) (1.01) (0.38) (1.25) (2.00) (2.44) 
15 -403.3'-2.91 -3.99 122.56 -0.75 -16.83 -36.94 66.36 .889 (16.83) (2.31) ( 5.11 )( 3 . 61 ) (1.33) (2.98) 
16 -489.6 -2.67 0.67 -4.58 3.06 123.12 -0.73 0.10 -27.33 -36.48 60 54 
.916 (14.52)( 2.28) (2.65)(3.60) (5.08)(3.64)(0.51) (2.4) (3.15) • 
17 -528.1 -2.63 0.68 -4.15 2.97 125.92 -0.70 -27.33 -38.25 69.33 .918 (16.02)(2.35) (2.79)(3.61) (5.39)( 3. 71) . (2.42) (3.52) 
18 -644.7 -2.67 0.65 -4.20 2.79 137.28 -0.60 -0.001 -29.44 -37.13 62.42 .919 (16.04)(2.24 ) (2.83)(3.35) (5.46)(2.87) (1.19) (2.59) (3.42) 
19 -548.1 -2.62 0.69 -4.39 2.96 128.17 -0.68 -0.002 -27.92 -31.52 60.27 .916 
(15.33)( 2.34) (2.58)(3.55) (5.17)( 3.37) (0.30) (2.41) (3.33) 
20 -584.4 -2.62 0.68 -4.48 2.91 131. 99 -0.66 -0.001 -28.12 -31.95 60.42 .916 (15.65)(2.31) (2.64)( 3.43) (4.78)( 3.02) (0.42) (2.43) (3.45) 
21 -604.9 -2.61 0.72 -4.08 2.85 131.29 -0.71 0.54 -27.36 -37.57 60.43 .916 (15.08)( 2.35) (2.70)(3.23) ( 4 . 92 )( 3 . 08 ) (0.43) (2.40) (3.38) 
22 -225.2 -2.83 0.58 -3.87 ' 104.22 -0.64 -16.39 -33.55 60.16 .894 (16.15)(1.77) (2.30) ( 4 . 07 )( 2 . 99 ) (1.33) (2.74) 
23 -429.2 -2.87 0.54 -3.98 123.31 -0.49 -0.002 -20.59 -32.29 (16.54)(1. 68) (2.41) (4.46)(2.12) (1. 64) (1.67) (2.68) 55.10 .897 
24 -561. 3 -2.88 -4.84 138.99 -0.64 -0.003 -19.42 -36.42 56.85 .889* (16.20) (2.48) ( 4 . 68 )( 2 . 71 ) (0.94) (1. 50) (2.93) 
25 -598.2 -2.87 -3.91 137.04 -0.91 1.03 -17.83 -36.47 56.47 .888 (15.67) (2.25) (4.53)(3.17) (0.79) (1.40) (2.93) 
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TABLE THREE 
OBSERVED CALCULATED RESIDUAL 
Alabama 964.000 968.548 -4.548 
Alaska 923.000 973.331 -50.331 
Arizona 981 .000 990.439 -9.439 
Arkansas 999.000 996.914 2.086 
California 899.000 888.955 10.045 
Colorado 983.000 990.349 -7.349 
Conneticut 896.000 862.349 33.651 
Delaware 897.000 903.988 -6.988 
District of Columbia 821.000 810.625 10.375 
Florida 889.000 903.336 -14.336 
Georgia 823.000 811.678 11.322 
Hawaii 857.000 874.474 -17.474 
Idaho 995.000 1007.431 -12.431 
Illinois 977.000 965.446 11.554 
Indiana 860.000 882.330 -22.330 
Iowa 1088.000 1034.669 53.331 
Kansas 1045.000 1030.118 14.882 
Kentucky 985.000 976.313 8.687 
Louisiana 975.000 961.802 13.198 
Maine 890.000 915.699 -25.699 
Maryland 889.000 882.031 6.969 
Massachusetts 888.000 873.194 14.806 
Michigan 973.000 954.538 18.462 
Minnesota 1028.000 1031.863 -3.863 
Mississippi 988.000 988.553 -0.553 
Missouri 975.000 994.843 -19.843 
Montana 1033.000 1030.482 2.518 
Nebraska 1045.000 1041.384 3.616 
Nevada 917.000 961.760 -44.760 
New Hampshire 925.000 901.805 23.195 
New Jersey 869.000 855.954 13.046 
New Mexico 997.000 989.339 7.661 
New York 896.000 842.726 53.274 
North Carolina 827.000 837.911 -10.911 
North Dakota 1068.000 1046.344 21 .656 
Ohio 958.000 963.565 -5.565 
Oklahoma 1001.000 1023.504 -22.504 
: Oregon 908.000 920.856 -12.856 
P~nnsylvania 885.000 891.310 -6.310 
Rhode Island 877.000 870.165 6.835 
South Carolina 190.000 819.828 -29.828 
South Dakota 1015.000 1051.934 23.066 
Tennessee 999.000 967.014 31.986 
Texas 868.000 911.147 -43.147 
Utah 1022.000 988.129 33.871 
Vermont 904.000 920.333 -16.333 
-.. 
Virginia 888.000 885.416 2.584 
. West Virginia 968.000 991.235 -23.235 
- Wisconsin 1011.000 1006.561 4.439 
Wyoming 1011.000 1043.481 -26.481 
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